Takuma WakayamaAssociate Professor
Faculty of Economics
Fushimi-ku, Kyoto 612-8577, Japan
Phone: +81 75 645 7894
Fax: +81 75 645 6444
Research InterestsMechanism Design, Social Choice Theory, Game Theory.
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: Characterizations and maximality-of-domains results, Social Choice and Welfare, 49, 357-385, August 2017.
Download the working paper version (June 2017).
New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation (with Hideki Mizukami), Economics Letters, 152, 76-78, March 2017.
Download the working paper version (August 2016).
Download the working paper version (April 2014).
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (with Yuji Fujinaka), Journal of Economic Theory, 158, 165-185, July 2015.
Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule (with Toyotaka Sakai), Theory and Decision, 72, 287-301, March 2012.
Download the working paper version (April 2011).
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (with Yuji Fujinaka), Economic Theory, 48, 147-169, September 2011.
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity (with Hideki Mizukami), Mathematical Social Sciences, 58, 256-264, September 2009.
Download the working paper version (July 2007).
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (with Yuji Fujinaka), Economics Letters, 100, 91-95, July 2008.
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (with Hideki Mizukami), Games and Economic Behavior, 60, 307-325, August 2007.
The working paper version can be downloaded here.
Bossiness and implementability in pure exchange economies (with Hideki Mizukami), RIMS Kokyuroku, 1461, 126-140, December 2005.
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: An experimental comparison (with Tatsuki Homma, Hirofumi Yamamura, and Takehiko Yamato), October 2017.
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences (with Kazuhiko Hashimoto), March 2017.
This is a substantially revised version of ISER Discussion Paper No. 947 (September 2015).
Corrigendum to "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium" [Games and Economic Behavior 44(2003)379-389] (with Koji Takamiya, Chaowen Yu, and Tomoichi Shinotsuka), June 2013.
Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions (with Hideki Mizukami), October 2012.
The cognitive processing of altruistic and spiteful behavior: An fMRI study (with Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi, Takafumi Yamakawa, Jun Shinozaki, Makoto Kato, Kenju Akai, Tsutomu Murata, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo), May 2009.
Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two (with Toyotaka Sakai), November 2008.
This is a revised version of RIETI Discussion Paper 03-E-017 (August 2003).
Dominant Strategy implementation in pure exchange economies (with Hideki Mizukami), Discussion Papers in Economics and Business No. 04-03-Rev., Osaka University, March 2005.
A substantially revised version of this paper was published as "Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, 60, 307-325, August 2007.
Endogenous choice of voting rules with abstention in homogenous societies, under revision.
Work in Progress
Pre-exchange-proof kidney exchange (with Yuji Fujinaka).
Referee ActivitiesEconomics Bulletin, Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Japanese Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, Review of Economic Design, Social Choice and Welfare.